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IS THE FINANCIAL INDUSTRY REGULATORY AUTHORITY
A GOVERNMENT AGENCY?
By Roberta S. Karmel 1
I.

INTRODUCTION

1

Roberta S. Karmel is Centennial Professor of Law at Brooklyn Law School and CoDirector of the Center for the Study of International Business Law at Brooklyn Law School. She
is a former Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission, a former director of the
New York Stock Exchange, Inc. and a former member of the National Adjudicatory Council of
the NASD. A summer research stipend from Dean Joan Wexler, Brooklyn Law School, is
gratefully acknowledged. The research assistance of Leigh Duffy, Brooklyn Law School
student, is also appreciated and acknowledged. Thanks also are due to my colleague Jason
Mazzone for his helpful comments.
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The National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (“NASD”) and NYSE Group, Inc.
(“NYSE”) have combined their regulatory operations into a new entity called the Financial
Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”). 2 The stated purpose for this consolidation is to bring
more efficiency to securities industry regulatory efforts by creating a single rule book for brokerdealers. FINRA is a monopoly self-regulatory organization (“SRO”) under the active and direct
oversight of the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”). 3 Although both the NASD and
the NYSE have long histories as SROs, subject to increasingly pervasive and statutorily based
SEC regulation, the creation of FINRA poses a question long lurking in the structure and
operation of the NASD: was the NASD for all practical purposes a government agency, and if
so, what are the constitutional and administrative law ramifications of such a conclusion for its
new incarnation, FINRA?
Both the NASD and the NYSE began as voluntary organizations of broker-dealers. The
NYSE was organized in 1792 to govern securities trading in the wake of a scandal in the
government bond market in the early days of the United States. 4 The NASD was formed in
2

See Suzanne Craig, NASD Arm’s Name Lands Regulator In Alphabet Soup, WALL ST. J.,
July 13, 2007, at C2. FINRA News Release, NASD and NYSE Member Regulation Combine to
Form the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority–FINRA; FINRA Commences Operations as
the Securities Industry’s Largest Non-Governmental Regulatory Organization, available at
http://www.finra.org/PressRoom/newsReleases/2007NewsReleases/PO36329.
3

The SEC approved a rule to amend the NASD By-Laws to accomplish this merger in
Self-Regulatory Organizations; National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.; Order
Approving Proposed Rule Change to Amend the By-Laws of NASD to Implement Governance
and Related Changes to Accommodate the Consolidation of the Member Firm Regulatory
Functions of NASD and NYSE Regulation, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 56145 (July 26,
2007) [hereinafter SEC FINRA Approval].
4

See RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 383-84 (2004).
2
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1936, in a restructuring of a trade group known previously as the Investment Bankers
Association of America. 5 Shortly thereafter, the NASD was authorized as an “association” by
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), 6 and pursuant to that statutory
authorization, the NASD incorporated in Delaware in 1939 and became registered with the
SEC. 7 From 1934 until the present, Congress and the SEC have struggled to convert SROs from
“private clubs” to public bodies, frequently exploiting scandals to impose governance reforms on
exchanges and the NASD. 8 In 1983, every broker-dealer registered with the SEC became
required by statute to become a member of the NASD. 9
In 1975, the Exchange Act was amended and the SEC obtained greater authority to
regulate and supervise the NYSE and other exchanges and the NASD. The Securities Acts
Amendments of 197510 gave the SEC the power to initiate as well as approve SRO rule-making,

5

See Donna Nagy, Playing Peekaboo With Constitutional Law: The PCAOB and Its
Public/Private Status, 80 NOTRE DAME L.REV. 975, 1023-24 (2005) [hereinafter Nagy].
6

See Exchange Act, § 15A, 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (2000).

7

See ESTATE OF LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATIONS § 7-A-3 (3d ed.
2006); Onnig Dombalagian, Demythologizing the Stock Exchange; Reconciling Self-Regulation
and the National Market System, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 1069, 1076-77 (2005).
8

See generally Roberta S. Karmel, Turning Seats Into Shares: Causes and Implications of
Demutualization of Stock and Futures Exchanges, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 367, 403-09 (2002). See
also Norman S. Poser, The Stock Exchanges of the United States and Europe: Automation,
Globalization, and Consolidation, 22 UNIV. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 497, 516 (2001).
9

Exchange Act § 15(b)(8), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(8) (Supp. II 2002). There is an exemption
for broker-dealers doing business exclusively on a stock exchange. See Pub. L. No. 98-38, §
3(a), 97 Stat. 206 (1983). With the merger of the NASD and NYSE Regulation, Inc., this
exemption will no longer be relevant as such broker-dealers were NYSE members.
10

Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (1975).
3
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expanded the SEC’s role in SRO enforcement and discipline, and allowed the SEC to play an
active role in structuring the public securities markets.11 For the first time, the statute set forth
requirements with respect to the composition of exchange and association boards of directors, so
that the Exchange Act provides that the rules of an exchange or association must “assure a fair
representation of its members in the selection of its directors and administration of its affairs and
provide that one or more directors shall be representative of issuers and investors and not be
associated with a member of the exchange, broker, or dealer.”12
In 2002, the Exchange Act was again amended to give the SEC further authority over
these SROs. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 200213 mandated that stock exchange rules require
listed companies to have independent directors on audit, compensation and nominating
committees,14 but did not affect the governance of SROs. Nevertheless, the SEC has exerted
greater power over board composition of SROs in recent years, requiring a larger number of
directors independent of the SRO and the securities industry.
Exchanges and the NASD long served two functions. They were marketplaces for the
trading of securities and regulators of their markets and their members. As marketplaces, they
11

Exchange Act § 11A, 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1 (2000); Exchange Act § 19(c), 15 U.S.C. §
78s(c) (2000).
12

Exchange Act § 6(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a)(3) (2000); Exchange Act § 15A(b)(4), 15
U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(4) (2000).
13

Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
11, 15, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.).
14

See generally Roberta S. Karmel, Realizing the Dream of William O. Douglas –The
Securities and Exchange Commission Takes Charge of Corporate Governance, 30 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 79, 92-94, 108-113, 121-23 (2005).
4
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engaged in fixing commissions and spreads until these anti-competitive practices were banned
by the SEC.15 These anti-competitive, but long permitted activities, gave SRO members the
incentive to remain members of exchanges and the NASD and to uphold just and equitable
principles of trade. As regulators, they adopted rules, which can have the force of federal law16
and disciplined member firms and their associated members. These rules covered the handling of
transactions in the markets, requirements relating to the internal operations of member firms and
rules of fair practice for dealing with customers.17 In addition, they operated arbitration facilities
for disputes between member firms and their employees and between member firms and their
customers.18
Recently, the NYSE and the NASD separated their market and regulatory functions into
separate entities. Now that the broker-dealer regulatory functions of the NYSE and NASD have
merged, the monopoly status of the FINRA strengthens its role as a regulator of broker-dealers.
In connection with these developments, the SEC exercised greater plenary power over the
governance structure of the SROs. Over the years, the NYSE and the NASD have been treated as
private sector business organizations for certain purposes, and as government or quasigovernment entities for other purposes. Is FINRA, now organized and recognized, and
functioning only as a regulator under the aegis of the SEC a government regulator? And if so,
15

See Credit Suisse Secs. (USA) v. Billing, 127 S. Ct. 2383 (2007). See also Poser, note 8,
supra at 510.
16

Credit Suisse First Boston Corp. v. Grunwald, 400 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2005).

17

See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION (5th Ed. 2005), at §§
14.1[3].
5
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what are the implications of such a determination? This question needs to be examined in the
context of similar questions being raised with regard to a new securities industry regulator, the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”), which was structured, in theory, as
neither an SRO nor a government agency, and which has been challenged as an unconstitutional
organization.19
Regardless of whether the PCAOB should properly be categorized as a government
regulator, a self-regulator, or neither, it is unlikely that the courts will decide that the NASD
which operated for almost seventy years as an SRO, has somehow become an unconstitutional
government agency now that it has become FINRA. Nevertheless, its increasing government-like
functions and operations raise the question of what checks and balances and due process
procedures are necessary for such an SRO to have constitutional law accountability and
administrative law legitimacy. This article will address several important aspects of FINRA’s
functions and legal status which raise the following issues: first, FINRA’s immunity from suit;
second, the right of persons under FINRA investigation to claim their privilege against selfincrimination under the Fifth Amendment; third, the role of FINRA as manager of broker-dealer

18

See id. at Ch. 15.

19

See Free Ent. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24310
(Mar. 21, 2007). The district court assumed the PCAOB was a government
regulator and addressed Appointments Clause issues. In 1975, Congress created
the Securities Investment Protection Corporation (“SIPC”), as a broker-dealer
membership corporation, and specified that it shall not be “an agency or
establishment of the United States Government.” Pub. L. 91-958, 84 Stat. 1636, §
3 (1975), 15 U.S.C. § 78ccc (2000). The PCAOB regulates accountants who file
documents with the SEC. SIPC is an insurer of funds and securities in brokerdealer customer accounts.
6
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arbitration facilities; fourth, the due process rights of persons prosecuted by FINRA; and fifth,
FINRA’s role with respect to anti-trust and preemption issues.
Part II of this article will set forth the constitutional issues inherent in the FINRA’s status
as an SRO, in the context of its history under the Exchange Act, which has been repeatedly
amended to grant the SEC more control of SROs. This analysis is related to the Appointments
Clause issues which have been raised with respect to the governance of the PCAOB. Part III will
discuss cases addressing the NASD’s or NYSE’s immunity from suit for their regulatory
decisions and functions, the right of persons under NASD investigation to claim deprivation of
their Fifth Amendment rights, and the status of NASD arbitration facilities. Part IV will discuss
the constitutional and administrative due process rights of persons subject to FINRA
investigations and enforcement actions and FINRA rule-making, and inquire whether further
rights should be accorded to persons who are SRO members. Part V will discuss the status of
SRO rules in cases posing preemption and antitrust issues. The article will conclude that as long
as the securities industry, rather than the SEC, controls the governance of FINRA and the
selection of its Board of Governors, FINRA will not be a government entity, but since FINRA
will be exercising delegated governmental functions with regard to discipline and rule-making,
fundamental constitutional and administrative law protections should be afforded to persons
affected by these activities.
Each of these issues could probably generate an article on its own, so to some extent this
article will be speculative and hopefully will spark further work by the author and by others.
These are difficult and important issues which go to the heart of the legitimacy of the

7
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administrative state in which we live and work, at a time when governmental functions are being
continually privatized or outsourced.

Such outsourcing raises constitutional accountability

issues, which in the case of FINRA become a question of whether FINRA should be accountable
to its members, who are forced to join by federal statute, or to the general public, and if the
FINRA has indeed become a public organization, what distinguishes it from a government
agency?

II.

FACTORS FOR DETERMINING WHETHER FINRA WILL BE A GOVERNMENT
AGENCY
A.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

In theory, the government cannot delegate its power to a private standard setting body,
but there have been no cases striking down legislation on non-delegation grounds since the mid1930s.20 Although some academics have argued for a resuscitation of the non-delegation
doctrine,21 the Supreme Court has preferred to invoke the separation of powers doctrine or other
principles when non-delegation has been invoked.22 Generally courts have upheld legislation

20

See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama
Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). See also Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S.
417, 484-91 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
21

See STEPHEN G. BREYER et al., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 67-68
(6th ed. 2006). Other scholars have argued to the contrary. Id.
22

See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998); Mistretta v. United States,
488 U.S. 361, 371-80 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). See
also Steven G. Calabresi, The Centrality of Clinton v. City of New York, 99 NW. L. REV. 77, 8586 (2004).
8
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delegating governmental power to administrative agencies on the ground that an intelligible
principle is laid down in the statute for the agency to follow.23
The problem of a delegation by an agency, which is itself exercising delegated powers, to
a private standard setting body like FINRA further confounds the question of whether the private
body either is exercising delegated governmental power or is, indeed, a government entity. Yet,
such privatization of governmental functions has become increasingly common.24 There are two
basic analyses pursuant to which FINRA might be considered to be either a government agency
or a private body exercising delegated governmental power. These are the public entity and the
state action doctrines.
Because the U.S. Constitution applies to the government, private entities generally are
not liable for infringing constitutional protections of individuals. Nevertheless, private entities
and individuals are required to comply with constitutional imperatives if they are acting as the
state. This is sometimes referred to as the public entity doctrine, which emanates from Lebron v.
National Railroad Passenger Corp.25 in which the Court ruled that Amtrak was a public entity
or the Government itself for constitutional purposes, even though Congress declared that it

23

J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928); Yakus v. United
States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944). See, e.g., Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90 (1946).
24

See John J. Dilulio, Jr. Government by Proxy: A Faithful Overview, 116 HARV.L. REV.
1271 (2002); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543
(2000); Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367 (2003);
Steven J. Schwarcz, Private Ordering, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 319 (2002).
25

513 U.S. 374 (1995).
9
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would not be an agency of the United States.26 In order to meet the tests for categorizing a
private corporation as a government entity after Lebron, courts have required the following:
“[O]nly if (1) the government created the corporate entity by special law, (2) the
government created the entity to further governmental objectives, and (3) the government
retains permanent authority to appoint a majority of the directors of the corporation will
the corporation be deemed a government entity for the purpose of the state action
requirement.”27
As will be demonstrated below, FINRA is not a governmental entity under this
formulation since it was not created by special law and the government will not appoint a
majority of its directors. Nevertheless, FINRA could not exist without SEC approval, and the
SEC has dictated the composition of its board of governors, although not the persons who will
serve on the board. This differentiates FINRA from the PCAOB, which was created by a special
statute and whose chairman and directors are appointed by the SEC, and which may well be a
government entity under the Lebron analysis.28
Another level of analysis with respect to FINRA is whether, since it is funded entirely by
assessments on the securities industry, the government has delegated taxing authority to a private
26

Id. at 391. Previously, in San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. V. United States Olympic
Committee, 483 U.S. 522, 543 (1987), the Court held that a committee was not a part of the
government required to comply with the Constitution, although it had been chartered by
Congress, was regulated by federal law, and was partially federally funded.
27

Horvath v. Westport Library Ass’n, 362 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2004), quoting Hack v.
President & Fellows of Yale Coll., 237 F.3d 81, 84 (2d Cir. 2000).
28

See Nagy, note 5, supra. That the PCAOB is a government entity was essentially
conceded in Free Ent. v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24310
(Mar. 21, 2007). SIPC’s has a board of directors of 7 persons, one appointed by the Secretary of
the Treasury, one appointed by the Federal Reserve Board, and five by the President with the
advice and consent of the Senate. 78 U.S.C. ccc (c) (2000). Yet, the statute creating SIPC
specifies that it is not a government agency. See supra, note 19.
10
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body. At least one scholar has argued that the taxing authority should not be delegated, as this is
a prerogative of the Congress.29 On the other hand, as will be explained below, FINRA did not
originate as an agency created by the government, but began as a private organization that was
gradually transformed into an agency which exercises governmental functions.
Under the state action doctrine, the courts examine whether the conduct or activities of a
private party can be attributed to the government for purposes of constitutional law
accountability. The cases in this area are, at best, fact specific and doctrinally murky, but
traditionally required one of three circumstances: (1) the exercise of coercive power or
significant encouragement by the government of the activity in question; (2) performance of a
traditional governmental function by a private entity; and (3) a “symbiotic” interdependence
between the government and the private entity.30 One test of whether a private organization is a
state actor is whether it is exercising powers traditionally and exclusively reserved to
government. Therefore, a private utility company was held not to be a state actor when it cut off
service without notice and a hearing.31 However, running a (company) town was held to be state
action,32 as was holding an election for government office.33 Running and regulating schools
29

See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Reconsidering the Nondelegation Doctrine: Universal
Service, the Power to Tax and the Ratification Doctrine, 80 IND. L. J. 239 (____). According to
FINRA’s CEO, FINRA’s $550 million budget is paid by the securities industry. An Interview
with FINRA CEO Mary Shapiro, EQUITIES, Sept. 2007, at 61.
30

Nagy, supra note 5, at 483. See In the Matter of the Application of Justin F. Ficken,
Exchange Act Release No. 54699 (Nov. 3, 2006), at 7-9.

31

Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 3345, 352 (1974).

32

Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).

33

Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 666 (1944).
11
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has been held not to be an essential state function,34 but in an important recent case, Brentwood
Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association,35 the Court found a private entity
regulating high school athletics was a state actor because of government “entwinement.” After
Brentwood, some courts have focused on whether “the state has so far insinuated itself into a
position of interdependence with the private entity that it must be recognized as a joint
participant in the challenged activity.”36 Another test used in the state action cases applies
where the government affirmatively authorizes, encourages, or facilitates private conduct that
violates the Constitution.

So, for example, courts cannot enforce restrictive convenants.37

Generally, however, government licensing or regulating is not sufficient for a finding of state
action unless the government is encouraging or facilitating unconstitutional conduct.38
As will be demonstrated below, with respect to at least some of its activities, and in
particular disciplinary actions and rule-making, FINRA will be performing functions that can be
considered governmental. The issue, then, is whether persons affected adversely by such actions
34

In Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982) and National Collegiate Athletic
Association v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988), the Court found actions by a private school and a
private entity not to be state action.
35

531 U.S. 288 (2001). In this case the Supreme Court found state action based on
“entwinement” although in the past it used the phrase “entanglement” for finding state action.
See EDWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 517(3D ED. 2006).
36

Kirtley v. Rainey, 326 F.3d 1088, 1092 (9th Cir. 2003). See also Mathis v. PG & E, 75
F.3d 498, 503 (9th Cir. 1996).
37

Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). See also Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S.
922 (1982).
38

See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Moose Lodge Number
107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
12
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have been accorded necessary or appropriate constitutional or other rights. This article will
discuss some lines of cases in which the courts have treated the NASD or the NYSE as
governmental actors, and other lines of cases in which they have been treated as private actors.
Before turning to these cases, and their implications, this article will first set forth the history of
FINRA, and in particular its regulatory and governance structure.
B.

HISTORY AND ORGANIZATION OF THE NASD, NYSE REGULATION
AND FINRA

The NASD was a private not-for-profit Delaware membership corporation organized
pursuant to a statutory system authorizing SROs to act as quasi-governmental agencies for
certain purposes. It long served as a professional association, promoting its member’s interests,
but it also had statutory authority to sanction members who violated the NASD’s rules or the
federal securities laws.39 Its constitution specified that its purposes were:
1)

39

To promote through cooperative effort the
investment banking and securities business, to
standardize its principles and practices, to promote
therein high standards of commercial honor, and to
encourage and promote among members observance of
Federal and State securities laws;

2)

To provide a medium through which its membership may be
enabled to confer, consult, and cooperate with governmental and other
agencies in the solution of problems affecting investors, the public, and
the investment banking and securities business;

3)

To adopt, administer and enforce rules of fair practice and rules to
prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices, and in general to
promote just and equitable principles of trade for the protection of
investors;

See Nat’l Ass’n of Secs. Dealers, Inc. v. SEC, 431 F.3d 803 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
13

All rights reserved by Roberta S. Karmel-- DRAFT-- Do not quote without permission

4)

To promote self-discipline among members, and to investigate and
adjust grievances between the public and members and between members;

5)

To establish, and to register with the [SEC], as a national securities
association pursuant to Section 15A of the [Exchange Act] . . .and thereby
to provide a medium for effectuating the purposes of said section;

6)

To transact business and to purchase, hold, own lease, mortgage,
sell and convey any and all property, real and personal, necessary,
convenient or useful for the purposes of the NASD.”40

From its inception, the NASD was a peculiar body, designed to act as a regulator, but
also as a professional organization. Initially, the NASD was a voluntary organization of brokerdealers engaged in trading over-the-counter stocks. Its membership was nationwide, large and
diverse. Its emphasis was on self-regulation and discipline by members, as distinguished from
regulation by a hired staff, and in promoting voluntary compliance with ethical standards.41
Principles emanating from the Exchange Act and guiding the NASD were democratic
organization, business person’s judgment and local autonomy.42
The NASD was divided into 13 regional districts initially responsible for enforcing its
Rules of Fair Practice, managed by a district committee composed of six to 18 members and a
paid staff.43 There was a 21-person Board of Governors, nominated for three year terms by the

40

NASD, Inc., NASD Manual, Restated Certificate of Incorporation of NASD, Inc. (2006).

41

SEC, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL STUDY OF THE SECURITIES MARKET, H.R. Doc. No. 88-95,
pt. 4, at 679 (1963) [hereinafter Special Study].

42

Id. at 606-07.

43

Id. at 608.
14
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district committees.44 The Board was the center of responsibility and authority and it functioned
through a number of standing committees.

The most active committee was the National

Business Conduct Committee which was charged with oversight of the disciplinary process.45
An executive director headed the NASD staff in Washington, D.C.46
In 1971, the NASD launched the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated
Quotation system (“Nasdaq”), as an electronic stock market. Initially, Nasdaq was not much
more than a computer bulletin board system, and buyers and sellers continued to be connected by
broker-dealers in negotiated trades. As Nasdaq added trade and volume reporting and automated
trading systems, it became more of a stock market. Today, Nasdaq is completely separated from
the NASD, is a public company, and is recognized by the SEC as a stock exchange.47 Yet, much
of what held the NASD together was the economic self interest of securities dealers in
structuring the trading rules for the over-the-counter (“OTC”) market. These rules gave NASD
members the ability to trade with one another at preferential prices.48
Although the efficacy of self-regulation was called into question by stock market abuses,
especially in the OTC market, the 1963 SEC Special Study concluded that self-regulation should

44

Id. at 609.

45

Id. at 614.

46

Id. at 624-25.

47

Exchange Act Release No. 53128, 71 Fed. Reg. 3550 (Jan. 23, 2006).

48

See Roger D. Blanc, Intermarket Competition and Monopoly Power in the U.S. Stock
Markets, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. & COM. L. 273, 278 (2007). See also United States v. Nat’l Ass’n of
Secs Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694 (1975).
15
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be maintained and strengthened.49 Self-regulation was similarly questioned in the mid 1970s, but
the Securities Act Amendments of 197550 continued the role of stock exchanges and the NASD
as SROs, yet strengthened the SEC’s oversight role by, among other things, giving the SEC the
power to initiate as well as approve SRO rule-making,51 expanding the SEC’s role in SRO
enforcement and discipline,52 and allowing the SEC to play an active role in structuring the
trading markets.53 Also, for the first time, the statute set forth requirements with respect to the
composition of exchange and association boards of directors, providing that the rules of such
organizations must “assure a fair representation of its members in that one or more directors
shall be representative of issuers and investors and not be associated with a member of the
[exchange or association], broker or dealer.”54
The 1975 Act Amendments also created two additional broker-dealers membership
organizations–SIPC and the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (“MSRB.”) SIPC’s board
members are appointed by a combination of the Secretary of the Treasury, the Federal Reserve
Board and the SEC, although SIPC is a not-for-profit D.C. corporation.55 The MSRB’s members

49

Special Study, note 41, supra, at pt. IV, p. 502.

50

Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (1975).

51

Exchange Act § 19(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (2000) .

52

Exchange Act § 19(c), (d), (g), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c), (d), (g) (2000).

53

Exchange Act § 11A, 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1 (2000).

54

Exchange Act § 6(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a)(3); Exchange Act § 15A(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. §
78o-3(b)(4) (2000).
55

15 U.S.C. § 78ccc (2000).
16
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are appointed by the SEC.56 SIPC insures cash and securities in broker-dealer customer
accounts, and oversees broker-dealer bankruptcies. The MSRB is a rule-making body. Both
SIPC and the MSRB are funded by assessments on their members.57
The NASD was completely reorganized in 1996 in the wake of a Department of Justice
and SEC investigation into anti-competitive practices by OTC market makers.58 This proceeding
involved a pricing convention by Nasdaq market makers by which most Nasdaq stocks were
quoted in even eighths.59 Other abusive market maker practices were uncovered and the NASD
was criticized for its regulatory deficiencies in failing to discover these practices or discipline its
members. The SEC found that the NASD was unduly influenced by Nasdaq market makers with
respect to rule-making, the disciplinary process and the admission of new members.60 In a
settlement of these matters, the NASD agreed, among other things, to achieve greater diversity of
representation on its board and its policy-making committees, to provide for the autonomy and
independence of its staff with respect to disciplinary and regulatory matters, to create an

56

15 U.S.C. § 78o-4 (2000).

57

See 78ggg (2000); Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board,
www.msrb.org/msrbl/whatsnew/default.asp.
58

Report Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Regarding the
NASD and Nasdaq Market, Exchange Act Release No. 37542 (Aug. 8, 1996) [hereinafter
Section 21(a) Report].
59

Id. Subsequently, under the threat of Congressional legislation, the SROs moved to
decimal pricing. See PLI, THE SEC SPEAKS IN 1999, Corp. L. & Prac. Handbook B-1105, at 115119 (1999).
60

Section 21(a) Report, note 58, supra, at 2.
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enhanced audit trail and to improve its surveillance and examination of order handling and the
reliability of trade reporting.61
This settlement as to corporate governance reform was anticipated in the Select Committee Report (“Rudman
Report”) released by the NASD a year before.62

After the 1996 reorganization, the NASD was comprised of a parent holding company
and two operating subsidiaries – Nasdaq and NASD Regulation, Inc. (“NASDR”). Then, the
NASD acquired the American Stock Exchange, which operated as a separate subsidiary. All four
boards were constituency boards, required to have a majority of non-industry members.63
Procedures for the appointment to the National Adjudicatory Council (“NAC”), also were
61

Id. at 3.

62

NASD, Report of the NASD Select Committee on Structure and Governance to the
NASD Board of Governors (1995). This was essentially a committee of former regulators
including two former SEC Commissioners (Sommer and Pollack), a former SEC Associate
Division Director (Gleason) and a former SEC New York Regional Administrator
(Hammerman). The general principles concerning governance contained in the Rudman Report
included the following:
1)
2)

3)

4)
5)

Regulation of broker-dealers as a profession should be separated from and
performed independently of regulation of the OTC markets and Nasdaq;
Separate governing boards responsible for regulating broker-dealers and the
markets should each have fifty percent public membership, as should the board of
the parent company;
The composition of the boards should be tailored to reflect the interests of their
separate constituencies, and the board responsible for regulating broker-dealers
should provide for balanced representation of the NASD’s diverse membership,
including small and large firms;
The Nominating Committees for the boards should be composed equally of
NASD members and public members; and
The NASD’s professional staff should take an active management role, and
should take the views of all relevant constituencies into account.

Id. at 526.
63

By-Laws of the NASD, art. VII, § 4(a) (2006); Nasdaq By-Laws, art. IV, § 4.1 (2006);
NASDR By-Laws, art. IV, §§ 4.2, 4.3 (2007), NASD MANUAL, (CCH), 1315, 1503, 1703-3
(2006).
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specified in the 1996 restructuring. The NAC consists of from 12 to 14 members, and the number
of non-industry members must equal or exceed the industry members.64 NASDR continued to
have 11 district committees, each of which had a nominating committee and served as district
business conduct committees. But these district business conduct committees, which at one time
were the mainstay of NASD disciplinary activity, did not maintain the power they had before
1996 because the NASD disciplinary cases began to be tried before hearing officers. Further, the
NAC replaced the national business district conduct committee (which was abolished) as the
appeals body for disciplinary cases.65 The end result of all of these changes, essentially forced
upon the NASD in its settlement of the prosecution by the SEC and Department of Justice into
the charges of price fixing by Nasdaq dealers, was that the NASDR board, responsible for
disciplining broker-dealers had a minority of industry members and at least some of the “self”
was taken out of the securities industry’s primary SRO.
Further changes resulted from the 2000 decision by the NASD membership to
demutualize Nasdaq and turn it into a for-profit public company, a transaction which then
occurred in several stages.66 An important aspect of this transformation is that Nasdaq, which
previously was registered with the SEC as a securities information processor became registered

64

NASDR By-Laws, art. V, § 5.2(a), NASD MANUALGuide (2006).

65

NASD Inc., NASD CODE OF PROCEDURE, Rule 9213 (2006).

66

In the matter of the Application of the Nasdaq Stock Market LLC for Registration as a
National Securities Exchange, Exchange Act Release No. 53128, 71 Fed. Reg. 3550 (Jan. 23,
2006).
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as a national stock exchange.67 In order to become a public company and a national stock
exchange, Nasdaq and NASDR were forced to engage in years of negotiation with the SEC to
obtain the approvals needed for Nasdaq’s demutualization and recognition as an exchange, and
the SEC forced a complete separation of Nasdaq from NASDR.68
In the meantime, governance changes at the NYSE also were demanded by the SEC in
response to scandals. On September 17, 2003, Richard Grasso resigned as chairman and CEO of
the NYSE in the midst of a storm of criticism over his compensation.69 In addition, a series of
major securities cases concerning questionable and illegal behavior by securities firms and stock
exchange specialists,70 raised questions not only about the NYSE’s effectiveness as a regulator,

67

Id.

68

See id.

69

See Kate Kelly & Susanne Craig, Weakened NYSE Faces Host of Challenges, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 18, 2003, at C1.
70

See Laurie P. Cohen & Kate Kelly, NYSE Turmoil Poses Question: Can Wall Street
Regulate Itself?, WALL ST. J., Dec. 31, 2003, at A1. In 2005 the United States Attorney’s Office
and the SEC charged fifteen specialists for violating federal securities laws through patterns of
fraudulent and improper trading. See Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, S.D.N.Y., 15
Current and Former Registered Specialists on the New York Stock Exchange Indicted on Federal
Securities Fraud Charges 1 (Apr. 12, 2005), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nys/PressReleases/April05/SpecialistIndictmentPR.pdf; Press
Release, SEC Institutes Enforcement Action Against 20 Former New York Stock Exchange
Specialists Alleging Pervasive Course of Fraudulent Trading (Apr. 12, 2005), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2005-54.htm. In addition, the SEC charged the NYSE with
failing to police the accused specialists. See Press Release, SEC Charges the New York Stock
Exchange With Failing to Police Specialists (Apr. 12, 2005), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2005-53.htm.
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but also about the long term viability of the exchange’s floor trading system.71 In response to
these serious problems, the Interim Chairman and CEO of the NYSE, put forth a proposal to
reorganize the NYSE’s board of directors and alter its enforcement arm. A reconstituted board of
directors, of six to twelve members, plus a chairman and CEO, was put into place.72 All of the
board members other than the CEO were required to be independent of management, members
and listed companies. This board was then given the responsibility for appointing a board of
executives of twenty-two members, responsive to the exchange’s various constituencies and
comprised of institutional investors, listed company CEOs, lessor members, upstairs firm CEOs,
specialist firm CEOs, floor brokers and the NYSE Chair and CEO. The board of executives was
scheduled to meet with the board of directors at least six times a year to discuss exchange
performance, membership issues, listed-company issues and public issues relating to market
structure and performance. Like the NASD’s 1996 reorganization, the NYSE’s changed structure
was put in place under the duress of government investigations and prosecutions and reflected
the SEC’s ideas of appropriate SRO governance. Also, like the NASD’s 1996 reorganization,
this new structure took much of the “self” out of self-regulation.

71

See Aaron Luchetti & Kara Scannell, Fifteen Indicted in NYSE Case, WALL ST. J., Apr.
13, 2005, at C1; New Order At Big Board, Years of Turmoil Give Chief Opening for Change,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 22, 2005, at A1.
72

See Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Amendment and
Restatement of the Constitution of the Exchange to Reform the Governance and Management
Architecture of the Exchange, Exchange Act Release No. 48,946, 68 Fed. Reg. 74,678, 74,679
(Dec. 24, 2003) [hereinafter NYSE Constitution Reform Filing], available at
http://sec.gov/rules/sro/34-48764.pdf.
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Following the NYSE’s reorganization, the NYSE also demutualized and became a public
company through a back door merger with Archipelago Holdings, Inc. (“Arca”), an electronic
trading firm.73 In connection with the merger of the NYSE and Arca, NYSE Regulation, Inc.
(“NYSE Regulation”) was formed as a separate not-for-profit subsidiary of NYSE Group. It has
a number of structural and governance features designed to ensure its independence, in addition
to its separate not-for-profit form. Each director of NYSE Regulation, other than its CEO, must
be independent and a majority of the members of NYSE Regulation’s board and its
compensation and nominating committees must be persons who are not directors of NYSE
Group.

It programs are funded primarily through fees assessed directly on member

organizations.74 The regulatory activities of NYSE Regulation included: listed company
compliance; member firm regulation; market surveillance; enforcement; and dispute
resolution/arbitration.75 Subsequent to this reorganization, NYSE once again changed its identity
and governance by merging with Euronext, N.V. to form NYSE Euronext, Inc. (“NYSE
Euronext”).76
73

See Redrawing the battle lines, ECONOMIST, Apr. 30, 2005, at 70.

74

NYSE Group, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 41-42 (Mar. 31, 2006),
available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/2502T05_CNB.pdf.
75

Id. at 39-40. NYSE Regulation will continue to function as a pared down organization to
regulate the NYSE market, but not its member firms. Similarly, Nasdaq will regulate its market,
but have no responsibility for member firm regulation.

76

After the merger, the NYSE Euronext board of directors consisted of 22 directors,
including an equal number of U.S. and European domiciliaries, of which 11 were NYSE
directors, including the CEO and Chairman of the NYSE. See Proxy Statement of NYSE Group,
Inc. and Prospectus of NYSE/Euronext, Inc., Nov. 27, 2006, at 166-167. Since the NYSE
remains as a subsidiary of NYSE Euronext, the status of NYSE Regulation is unchanged.
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The governing changes at both the NASD and the NYSE, resulting in the separation of
their market and regulatory functions and the consoldiation of NASDR and NYSE Regulation
into FINRA need to be understood against a Securities Industry Association White Paper on
Self-Regulation initially published in 2000,77 SEC proposed rules on SRO governance78 and an
SEC concept release on setting forth a variety of models for self-regulation.79
The SEC’s proposed governance rules for stock exchanges and the NASD would require
that these SROs and any of their affiliates have boards with a majority of independent directors80
and that their nominating, governance, compensation, audit and regulatory oversight standing

77

SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. ASS’N, REINVENTING SELF-REGULATION: WHITE PAPER FOR
THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION’S AD HOC COMMITTEE ON REGULATORY IMPLICATIONS
OF DEMUTUALIZATION (Oct. 14, 2003), available at
http://staging.sifma.org/regulatory/structure/html/whitepaperfinal.html. The Securities Industry
Association was subsequently renamed Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association
(“SIFMA”).
78

Fair Administration and Governance of Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act
Release No. 50699, 69 Fed. Reg. 71,126, 71,134-40, (Dec. 8, 2004) [hereinafter SRO
Governance Release].
79

Concept Release Concerning Self-Regulation, Exchange Act Release No. 50,700, 69
Fed. Reg. 71,256 (proposed Dec. 8, 2004) [hereinafter SRO Concept Release].
80

An “independent director” would be defined as a director who has no material
relationship with an exchange or affiliate of an exchange, or any member of the exchange or
affiliate of a member, or any issuer listed or traded on the exchange. SRO Governance Release,
supra note 78, at 71,214-15 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.6a-5(b)(12). Further, employment
by an exchange or member within the past three years, or the receipt of $60,000 by the director
or an immediate family member from the exchange or a member within the past year makes a
director not independent. There is a similar definition of an “independent director” for the
NASD. Id. at 71,219 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.15A-3(b)(13).
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committees be composed of independent directors. These standing committees would be
mandated, and the SEC sets forth in its proposal their minimum purposes and responsibilities.81
Section 6(b)(3) of the Exchange Act requires that the rules of an exchange assure a fair
representation of its members in the selection of its directors and the administration of its affairs.
Further, an exchange must provide that one or more directors be representative of issuers and
investors and not be associated with a member of the exchange, broker or dealer.82 The SEC’s
rule proposal regarding exchange governance would require that the nominating committee of
the board administer a fair process that provides members with the opportunity to select at least
20% of the total number of directors. The SEC asserts that the board could nevertheless be
composed solely of independent directors, so long as 20% of those independent directors are
selected by the exchange’s members. This may not be consonant with the statute, and although it
justified the reorganized NYSE board described above, it transformed the NYSE into an
organization without securities industry members and therefore raised an issue as to whether the
NYSE continues to be an SRO.83
Both the reorganizations and public offerings of the NYSE and NASD described above
were opposed by some broker-dealers who believed their interests were not fairly represented in

81

SRO Governance Release, supra note 78, at 71,134-40.

82

15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(3) (2000). Section 15A(b)(4) of the Exchange Act contains an
identical requirement applicable to the NASD. 15 U.S.C. 78o-3(b)(4) (2000).
83

See Comment Letter from Edward S. Knight, Exec. Vice President and Gen. Counsel,
Nasdaq, to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, SEC, 11-13 (Mar. 8, 2005) (regarding the Proposed
Rulemaking on SRO Governance (File No. S7-39-04), as well as the Concept Release
Concerning Self-Regulation (File No. S7-40-04)) [hereinafter Nasdaq Comment Letter].
24

All rights reserved by Roberta S. Karmel-- DRAFT-- Do not quote without permission
the demutualization and merger of the regulatory functions of NYSE Regulation and NASDR.84
Essentially, some seat holders believed that they were not being adequately compensated for
their ownership interests when the NYSE demutualized and merged with Arca and sued the
exchange and its CEO and directors alleging conflicts of interest and breach of fiduciary duties
under state law.85 This case was settled after the defendants lost a motion to dismiss.86 In
connection with the creation of FINRA, some small broker-dealers who were not NYSE
members brought a lawsuit alleging that their interests had been overrun by the large NYSE
member firms.87 This case was dismissed on the ground that the plaintiffs had not exhausted
their administrative remedies at the SEC in connection with the SEC’s approval of the NASD’s
By-Law changes which brought FINRA into existence. While these cases are to some extent
about the economics of these transactions they also highlight a governance problem. Will
FINRA, which is being formed at the urging of the large broker-dealer firms, and under the

84

See Standard Inv. Chartered, Inc. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Secs Dealers, Case No. 07-CV-2014
(S.D.N.Y. 2007); Aaron Lucchetti & Gregory Zuckerman, The Ultimate “Mark to Market” Will
Seatholders Get Fair Value Under NYSE’s Proposed Deal? The Takeover Battle Takes Shape,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 2005, at C1.
85

See Higgins v. New York Stock Exch., Inc., 2005 NY SlipOP 25365 (N.Y. Sup.
corrected Dec. 28, 2005), Index No. 601646/05.
86

Id.; Higgins v. New York Stock Exch, Inc., Index No. 601646/05 (N.Y. Sup. Dec. 5,
2005) (opinion accepting offer of settlement).
87

Standard Inv. Chartered, Inc. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Secs. Dealers, Case No. 06-CV 2014
(S.D.N.Y. 2007).
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direction of the SEC, treat smaller firms and specialists (who were not previously NASD
members) fairly?88
Both Nasdaq and the SIA strongly objected to the SEC’s proposal that exchange boards
not include issuer or member firm representatives. Nasdaq argued that such a regulation would
“either marginalize members and issuers or result in an unwieldy and excessively bureaucratic
decision-making process that is ill suited to a public company . . .”89 The SIA argued that any
governance reforms should be consistent with the balance between SEC oversight of SROs and
regulation guided by the direct involvement of industry participants in both SRO and market
functions.90
FINRA will meet these requirements with a 23 person Board of Governors, having 11
seats held by Public Governors, and FINRA’s CEO, Mary Schapiro, and the current Chief
Regulatory Officer of the NYSE, Richard Ketchum, serving as the non-executive Chairman of

88

FINRA’s proposed governance structure will accord these members three constituency
seats on its Board of Governors. See SEC FINRA Approval, note 3, supra, text at note 184.
89

Nasdaq Comment Letter, supra note 83, at 12.

90

Comment Letter from Marc E. Lackritz, President, SIA, to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, SEC,
4 (Mar. 9, 2005) (regarding the SRO Governance and Transparency Proposal (File No. S7-3904), as well as the SRO Concept Release (File No. S7-40-04)) [hereinafter SIA Comment
Letter]. In addition to mandating a board of independent directors, the SEC proposed that
exchanges and associations effectively separate their regulatory functions from their market
operations and other commercial interests, use regulatory funds only to fund regulatory
obligations, and establish procedures to prevent the dissemination of regulatory information to
third parties. In the SEC’s view, the conflicts between an exchange as a market operator and as a
regulator, and as a membership organization and as a regulator, are exacerbated if an exchange
demutualizes and has shareholders to whom it is responsible, and so separation of the regulatory
component of an exchange or association’s functions is therefore necessary. SRO Concept
Release, supra note 79, at 71,141.
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the Board. Of the industry seats, large firms, consisting of 500 or more registered persons, and
small firms, consisting of 150 or fewer registered persons, will each be guaranteed 3 elective
seats. In addition, NYSE floor members, independent dealer/insurance affiliated firms, and
investment company affiliates will each be guaranteed one seat.91
The SEC’s preoccupation with the conflicts between an exchange’s regulatory functions
and its members, market operations, listed issuers, and shareholders also prompted the issuance
of a concept release on the future of SROs. Although the concept release detailed these conflicts,
it is worth noting that all of these conflicts have existed for many years, except for the conflict
between an exchange’s regulatory functions and shareholders. Further, it can be argued that the
conflicts between exchange regulatory functions and shareholders is a less acute conflict than
between exchange regulatory functions and members. Nevertheless, the SEC seized upon the
91

See SEC FINRA Approval, supra, note 3; Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman and CEO, NASD,
Testimony Concerning Consolidation of NASD and Regulatory Functions of NYSE: Working
Towards Improved Regulation Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs (May 17, 2007), available at
http://www.nasd.com/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/MaryL.Schapiro/NASDW_019169;
NASD Members Overwhelming Approve Plan for New SRO for Member Regulation, 39 SEC.
REG & L. REP. (BNA), Jan. 29, 2007, at 130. Another important part of the SEC’s proposal is a
limitation on the amount of stock in an exchange or association which could be owned or voted
by any one broker-dealer. The proposal is 20%, with a request for comment as to whether this
should be lower. Id. at 71,143-46. The SEC also proposed special rules for exchanges or
associations which go public and list on their own boards. Id. at 71,227-28 (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. § 242.800). Finally, the SEC proposed a complete overhaul of the public disclosures
made by exchanges and associations, as well as the disclosures made by them to the SEC on a
confidential basis. Some of the disclosures which could be of interest include what proportion of
an exchange or association’s total budget is devoted to regulatory expenses, as well as the dollar
amounts of regulatory revenues and expenses. Other relevant financial information required to
be disclosed on an annual basis would include revenues from regulation, transaction fees, market
information fees, fines and penalties, listing fees and other fees paid by issuers, and investments.
Id. at 71,241-54 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 249.2). Now that NYSE Euronext and Nasdaq are
public SEC reporting companies, these disclosure proposals are, for the most part, moot.
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approvals needed by Nasdaq and the NYSE in connection with their transformation from
mutualized SROs to demutualized public stock exchanges to restructure their boards and
operations to accord with the SEC’s views on how SROs for broker-dealers and market makers
should function.
The statute creating the PCAOB specified that the SEC, after consultation with the
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board and the Secretary of the Treasury would appoint its
chairman and board members.92 In Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB,93 the plaintiff made a
number of claims that the PCAOB was unconstitutional, but the claim which has thus far
received the most attention is whether, assuming the PCAOB is a government entity, the method
of appointing its board violates the Appointments Clause of the Constitution.94 If FINRA were
held to be a government entity, these same issues would arise. In order to avoid these problems,
the SEC should be careful to refrain from interfering in the appointment of persons to FINRA’s
board. Although thus far, the SEC has ventured beyond the securities laws in designating the
characteristics of board members, it has not suggested or vetoed particular individuals for these
slots. Nevertheless, because the SRO rule-making process is so opaque, it is difficult to know

92

15 U.S.C. § 7211(e)(4)(A) (2002).

93

2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24310 (Mar. 21, 2007).

94

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The Complaint also claimed that the creation of the
PCAOB violated the Separation of Powers Clause, Art. II, §§ 1,2, and was an unconstitutional
delegation. Art. I, § 1.
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what transpired in the negotiations between the SEC and the NASD and NYSE Regulation in the
approval proceedings for FINRA.95
In its concept release on the future of SROs, the SEC set forth seven alternative
approaches to SRO regulation.96 One of the options, which as the SEC then admitted, would
require significant system restructuring, was dubbed the Hybrid Model. Pursuant to this model,
the SEC would designate a market neutral single SRO to regulate all SRO members with respect
to membership rules, including members’ financial condition, margin practice, handling of
customer accounts, registered representative registration, branch office supervision and sales
practices. The market SROs would continue surveillance and enforcement of market rules.97
The SIA argued for the Hybrid Model of self-regulation whereby the exchanges would
regulate their markets, but the SEC would designate a single SRO to regulate members with
respect to such matters as financial condition, margin, registered representative qualification

95

See Lanny Schwartz, Suggestions for Procedural Reform in Securities Market
Regulation, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 411, 431-436 (2007).
96

The first approach was the traditional, then existing system, enhanced by the proposals
for board independence and further disclosure by exchanges in the SEC’s SRO Release. SRO
Concept Release, supra note 79, at 71,262-77. The second approach was a variation of the
existing system which would mandate a separate market and regulatory subsidiary structure. Id.
at 71,277.
97

Id. at 71,277-78. A variation of this type of hybrid regulation would be a system where
market and other regulatory functions also would be split, but there would be competing Member
SROs and firms could periodically switch regulators. Id. at 71,278-79. The SEC also put out for
comment the model of a Universal Industry Self-Regulator that would be responsible for all
market and member rules, and a Universal Non-Industry Regulator like the PCAOB. Id. at
71,280-81.The SEC also asked for comment on substitution of SEC regulation for selfregulation, but was forced to admit that such a scheme when tried in only a limited fashion was a
failure, and had to be scrapped. Id. at 27,281-82.
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testing, customer accounts, sales practices and supervision. In the view of the SIA, such a selfregulatory model would eliminate inefficiencies in rulemaking and examinations and the
potential for inconsistent regulation. Further, it would resolve conflicts of interest between an
SRO’s regulatory and market functions.98 This Hybrid Model for self-regulation of brokerdealers was realized when FINRA was authorized by the SEC.
These rapid and wrenching changes in the business and regulatory models of the NYSE
and the NASD are due to technological changes in the trading of securities in an increasingly
globalized capital market and such regulatory changes as the permitted combination of
commercial and investment banks.99 With the advent of NYSE and Nasdaq as public companies
and the creation of FINRA as a single SRO for broker-dealers, it is appropriate to inquire what
kind of an entity FINRA will be and whether the statutory constraints and SEC oversight upon
the NYSE and the NASD are sufficient for this new SRO.

III.

IMMUNITY FROM SUIT, FIFTH AMENDMENT CLAIMS AND COMPULSORY
ARBITRATION
A.

INTRODUCTION

Two diametrically opposed lines of cases involve the immunity of SROs from damage
actions and the ability of persons under investigation by SROs to claim their privilege against
98

SIA Comment Letter, supra note 90, at 12.

99

See generally Roberta S. Karmel, The Once and Future New York Stock Exchange: The
Regulation of Global Exchanges, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 355 (2007). The GrammLeach Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-02, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) repealed the Glass-Steagall barriers
between commercial and investment banking.
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self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment. In the former, the courts have treated SROs as if
they were government entities. In the latter, the courts have refused to grant persons under
investigation the right to claim the Fifth Amendment on the ground that SROs are private bodies.
In cases challenging compulsory SRO arbitration, the courts have similarly sometimes viewed
SROs as government actors, and sometimes viewed SROs as private actors.
On a theoretical level these cases are impossible to reconcile, although they can be
justified on policy grounds as necessary for SROs to effectively perform their regulatory
functions. The courts have given deference to SRO conduct and arguments so as not to interfere
with their regulatory responsibilities, in apparent disregard of the serious discrepancies in
judicial precedents. Perhaps the public/private distinctions involving SROs are neither necessary
nor helpful, but rather, inquiry should be made of whether under the circumstances, there are
adequate protections for affected persons.100
An appreciation of these cases require a brief understanding of the rule-making and
disciplinary functions of SROs, and the SEC’s oversight of these activities. Self-regulation
always involved the promulgation of conduct rules for SRO members. Indeed, self-regulation
was frequently justified as a system for imposing ethical as well as legal standards on securities
industry professionals.101 These ethical standards are captured in the concept of “just and
equitable principles of trade” or rules of fair practice. Although these general concepts can still
100

See Chris Sagers, The Myth of “Privatization,” 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 37 (2007); Paul R.
Verkuil, Privatizing Due Process, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 963, 979-87 (2005).
101

See THE REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITIES OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON
BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, SECURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY, S. Doc. No. 13, at 149
(1st Sess. 1973).
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form the basis for disciplinary proceeding, in general, SRO standards are now contained in
lengthy and detailed rule-books of NYSE Regulation and the NASD, and one of the rationales
for combining these entities into FINRA is that these rules are frequently contradictory or
duplicative and the industry should be governed by a single rule-book.102 These rules cover a
wide variety of substantive negative and affirmative obligations of broker-dealers relating to the
prevention of fraud and manipulation in securities offerings and trading; protection of brokerdealers and their customers from undue financial risk and insolvency; and fair dealing by brokerdealers with their customers.
The SEC has oversight with respect to all SRO rule-making. Section 19(b)(1) of the
Exchange Act requires that all SROs file proposed rule changes with the SEC, and if the SEC
does not institute disapproval proceedings within 35 days of the proposed rule’s publication,
unless extended by the SEC to 90 days, the proposed rule becomes effective.103 In reality, rule
changes do not take effect this way. Generally, SROs consent to a waiver of the 35 day
effectiveness period and there are long periods of negotiation between an SRO and the SEC as to

102

See Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman and CEO, NASD, Testimony Concerning Consolidation
of NASD and Regulatory Functions of NYSE: Working Towards Improved Regulation Before
the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (May 17, 2007), available at
http://www.nasd.com/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/MaryL.Schapiro/NASDW_019169;
NASD Members Overwhelmingly Approve Plan for New SRO for Member Regulation, 39 SEC.
REG. & L. REP. (BNA), Jan. 29, 2007, at 130.
103

15 U.S.C. § 78o-3, 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(1) (2000).
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whether a new rule can become effective as written.104 The SEC also has the power to “abrogate,
add to, and delete from” the rules of an SRO, but this power is rarely utilized.105
SROs have broad authority to investigate and prosecute violations of their own rules and
also the violations of the federal securities laws.106 The NASD also enforces the rules of the
MSRB.107 SRO sanctions can range from censure to suspension to a permanent bar of brokerdealer and associated persons licensed to engage in the securities business. Further, these
sanctions overlap the ability of the SEC to discipline securities firms and personnel either in
administrative proceedings or injunctive actions, and conduct that violates SRO rules and federal
securities law regulations have also resulted in criminal prosecutions.108
Members of stock exchanges and the NASD have long been required to submit to
arbitration of disputes among themselves. Securities arbitration between broker-dealers and their
customers has been compelled since the Supreme Court permitted contracts to this effect in
1987.109 SRO arbitration facilities have a Uniform Code of Arbitration promulgated by the

104

See Lanny Schwartz, note 95, supra.

105

15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (2000). In one of the few instances where the SEC utilized this
power, the rule in question was overturned by the District of Columbia Circuit Court. Bus.
Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F. 2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
106

See Exchange Act § 15A(b)(7), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(7) (2000).

107

See id.; Blount v. SEC, 61 F.3d 938, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1995). The MSRB is an SRO for
municipal securities brokers and dealers. See notes 47-48, supra.
108

See, e.g., D.L. Cromwell Inv., Inc. v. NASD Regulation, Inc., 279 F.3d 155 (2d Cir.

2002).
109

Shearson/Am. Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987). See also Rodrigues de Quijas
v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
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Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration, and changes in these rules are subject to SEC
oversight as are all other SRO rules. The arbitration facilities of the NYSE and the NASD will be
combined in a separate entity as part of FINRA.
B.

IMMUNITY FROM SUIT

The NASD, NYSE and other securities industry SROs have been found to be immune
from suit when acting in their regulatory and general oversight functions. To this extent they
have been treated like government entities. In some cases, the courts have treated SROs as
having the same immunity from suit for conduct falling within the scope of their regulatory and
oversight functions as the SEC would have because they are performing the functions of a
government agency which would have sovereign immunity.110 In some cases, the SROs are
described as acting pursuant to “delegated” governmental authority.111 In other cases, the SRO’s
action are described as “quasi-govenmental.”112 The courts have reasoned that if the SROs could
be sued for damages in connection with exercising their regulatory responsibilities, they would
be discouraged from engaging in the effective self-regulation required by statute.113

110

Barbara v. New York Stock Exch., 99 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 1996). See also Scher v. Nat’l
Ass’n of Secs Dealers, Inc., 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 4692 (2d Cir. 2007).
111

E.g., Dexter v. Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., 406 F. Supp.2d 260 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).

112

In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 405 F. Supp.2d 281 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); DL Capital
Group LLC v. Nasdaq Stock Mkt., Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7955 (S.D.N.Y. 2004);
D’Alessio v. New York Stock Exch., Inc., 125 F. Supp.2d 6756 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
113

Dexter v. Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., 406 F. Supp.2d 260 (S.D.N.Y. 2005);
Trama v. New York Stock Exch, Inc., 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15543 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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Other cases have referenced the immunity of government officials from suits provided in
Butz v. Economou,114 in which a futures commission merchant sued the Secretary of Agriculture
and other officials for their actions in bringing an administrative proceeding. Although the
appeals court held that the officials had only a qualified immunity, the Supreme Court held that
where officials decide to initiate or continue a disciplinary proceeding subject to agency
adjudication they are entitled to absolute immunity from damages.115 In cases involving the
prosecutorial or adjudicatory functions of SROs, the courts have granted them absolute
immunity.116 In one interesting case where the SEC set aside an NASD sanction, a broker sued
the NASD for malicious prosecution. The court held that, although not prosecutors, the NASD
investigators were acting in a prosecutorial capacity and therefore were entitled to absolute
immunity from suit.117
C.

FIFTH AMENDMENT PLEAS

Because SROs do not have subpoena power, their members are required to “voluntarily”
cooperate with investigators and provide testimony and documents. Failure to cooperate can
result in sanctions ranging from censure to a bar from the securities business. Historically, the
114

438 U.S. 478 (1978).

115

In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) the Court distinguished between absolute
immunity situations and situation which give only qualified immunity because statutory or
constitutional rights have been implicated. See also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403
U.S. 368 (1971).
116

Austin Mun. Secs., Inc. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Secs Dealers, 757 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1985);
Manelbaum v. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., 894 F. Supp. 676, 680-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Shah v. Nat’l
Ass’n of Secs. Dealers, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6467 (D. Ill. 1999).
117

Zandford v. Nat’l Ass’n of Secs Dealers, 30 F. Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. 1998).
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NYSE imposed a bar for non-cooperating witnesses until they were willing to cooperate,118
while the NASD imposed a permanent bar against witnesses who refused to testify.119 In one
case the SEC justified the necessity for the NASD’s testimonial compulsion as necessary for its
regulatory responsibilities, but reversed a permanent bar, suggesting that the NASD review the
appropriateness of this sanction.120 Similarly, in PAZ Securities, Inc. v. SEC,121 the D.C. Circuit
remanded a case where the NASD had permanently barred an associated person for failing to
respond to requests for information, where the SEC had affirmed the bar without addressing
potentially mitigating factors. The court viewed such a bar as the industry equivalent of capital
punishment, and the court held that the SEC was required to explain why such a severe sanction
was remedial rather than punitive.122
The reasoning of the cases described above, giving SROs immunity from suit, is that
immunity from suit is necessary for SROs to exercise their regulatory functions effectively.
Similarly, cases denying that persons under investigation by SROs have the right to plead their
privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment are also justified on the grounds
that since SROs do not have subpoena power, they could not effectively operate as regulators if
they did not bar persons from continuing to be associated with member firms for their failure to
118

NYSE Rule 477; In the matter of Brian D. Stoker, NYSE Hearing Panel Dec. 05-103
(Dec. 19, 2005) and cases cited therein.
119

NASD Rule 8310; In the matter of Robert J. Langley, 2004 SEC LEXIS 3048 (Dec. 22,

2004).
120

Id.

121

2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 17412 (D.C. Cir. July 20, 2007).

122

Id. at 6, 8.
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cooperate if they refuse to testify or produce documents in an investigation.123 Nevertheless, in a
number of cases, persons investigated by SROs and subsequently charged in criminal actions for
the same conduct, have argued that the sanction of being barred from the securities business for
non-cooperation is essentially a deprivation of their Fifth Amendment constitutional right
because the Supreme Court has held that a witness cannot be deprived of his employment for
declining to provide testimony that could used against the witness in a criminal prosecution.124
The key case relied upon in cases where a denial of Fifth Amendment rights is claimed is
United States v. Solomon,125 in which testimony by an officer of a NYSE member firm was used
to indict him. The defendant in the criminal case argued that the NYSE had become an arm of
the government so the Fifth Amendment privilege excluding involuntary confessions from
evidence should be applied. The Second Circuit held that the actions of the NYSE were those of
a private body and not the government and therefore the Fifth Amendment privilege was
unavailable. The court stated: “This is but one of many instances where the government relied
on self-policing by private organizations to effectuate the purposes underlying federal regulating
statutes.”126 Similarly, in Jones v. SEC,127 the Fourth Circuit rejected a claim based on the Fifth
Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause on the ground that the NASD is not a government
123

See, e.g., Dep’t of Enforcement v. Steinhart, 2003 NASD Discip. LEXIS 23 (NASD
Discip. 2003); In the matter of John J. Fierro, Exchange Act Release No. 39544 (Jan. 13, 1998).

124

See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801 (1977); Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S.
70 (1973); Garrity v. State of New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
125

509 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1975).

126

Id. at 869.

127

115 F.3d 1173, 1182-83 (4th Cir. 1997).
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agency. These precedents have been followed in district court cases.128 In a case where a party
argued that the NASD is a quasi-governmental agency, the court held to the contrary, stating:
“NASD is not a government agency: it is a private, not-for-profit corporation chartered in
Delaware. It received no funding from any government, federal or state.”129
In recent years, the claims that the constitutional rights of persons under SRO
investigation have become more vociferous because of the simultaneous actions and cooperation
of SROs, the SEC and the Department of Justice in the prosecution of securities industry
professionals, and the SEC has begun to acknowledge that under some circumstances, an SRO
may be acting as an agent for the government in conducting an investigation. In Frank P.
Quattrone,130 a person under investigation acknowledged that he failed to respond to an NASD
request for information, contending that he had a Fifth Amendment right not to respond because
his requested testimony related to a joint investigation by the SEC, the NASD and the NYSE
into spinning and research analyst conflicts of interest at 12 broker-dealer firms, and therefore
the NASD investigation was “state action.” At a proceeding before a Hearing Panel Frank P.
Quattrone (“Quattrone”) refused to testify in view of a related pending criminal indictment
against him. The NAC increased the hearing panel’s sanction to a bar in all capacities because it

128

See, e.g., D.L. Cromwell Invs., Inc. v. NASD Regulation, Inc., 132 F. Supp. 2d 248
(S.D.N.Y. 2001); SEC v. Musella, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17999 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Datek Secs.,
Inc. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Secs. Dealers, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 230, 234 (S.D.N.Y. 1995);
129

Graman v. Nat’l Ass’n of Secs. Dealers, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11624 (D.D.C. 1998).

130

Exchange Act Release No. 53547 (Mar. 24, 2006).
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“found that Quattrone’s misconduct in refusing to testify was egregious.”131 The SEC reversed
and remanded, holding that Quattrone had the right to present evidence that the NASD’s role in
the joint investigation rendered its Rule 8210 request state action.132
Justin F. Ficken (“Ficken”) was a former associated person of an NASD member firm
who refused to provide testimony in an investigation into improper market timing and late
trading in mutual fund shares. A Hearing Panel barred Ficken from associating with any NASD
member in any capacity, and the NAC affirmed this sanction, finding that Ficken’s
“unsubstantiated, generalized assertion” that NASD staff had forwarded documents to the SEC
and the Department of Justice did not support a finding of state action.133 The SEC reversed and
remanded, giving Ficken the opportunity to conduct discovery to prove his allegations of joint
action between the NASD and the SEC, but noted that “cooperation between the Commission
and NASD will rarely render NASD a state actor, and the mere fact of such cooperation is
generally insufficient, standing alone, to demonstrate state action.”134 A similar opportunity to
prove state action in an NYSE proceeding where a specialist was barred for asserting the Fifth
Amendment in an investigation was afforded in Warren E. Turk.135

131

Id. at 8.

132

Id. at 11.

133

In the Matter of the Application of Justin F. Ficken, Exchange Act Release No. 54699
(Nov. 3, 2006), at 6.
134

Id. at 11.

135

Exchange Act Release No. 55942 (June 22, 2007).
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The PCAOB has the power of investigation similar to SROs, and can suspend or bar a
public accounting firm or associated person who refuses to testify.136 In addition, if a witness
refuses to cooperate, the PCAOB may request that the SEC issue a subpoena. Further, the
PCAOB is required to coordinate its investigations of potential securities law violations with the
SEC.137 Perhaps for these reasons, the PCAOB explicitly permits witnesses to claim a Fifth
Amendment privilege, but has reserved the right to draw an adverse inference from the assertion
of such a claim.138 With the recent recognition by the SEC that many SRO investigations are
joint investigations with the SEC and the Department of Justice, and the D.C. Circuit’s caution
that a permanent bar is a severe sanction which must be justified, it seems appropriate for the
SROs similarly to provide for Fifth Amendment pleas by persons under SRO investigation. If
this unduly hampers SRO investigations, two solutions are possible: first, a temporary
suspension until the witness decides to testify; or second, subpoena assistance from the SEC.
The imposition of a permanent bar by SROs for failure to testify would appear to be ill advised
in view of legal developments with regard to this area.
D.

ARBITRATION FACILITIES

Compulsory arbitration between member firms and member firms and their employees
has generally been viewed as a matter of private contract, a condition of being a member of an
136

Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 105, 15 U.S.C. § 7215 (2002).

137

Id.

138

See PCAOB Rule 5106; PCAOB Rulemaking, Proposed Rules Relating to Investigations
and Adjudications, Exchange Act Release No. 49454 (Mar. 19, 2004); PCAOB Rulemaking
Order Approving Rules Relating to Investigations and Adjudications, Exchange Act Release No.
49704 (May 14, 2004).
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SRO. Similarly, contractual arbitration provisions between member firms and their customers
have been upheld. Nevertheless, SRO arbitration has proven controversial for a variety of
reasons, most of which are not directly relevant to this article.139 Once FINRA is formed, the
arbitration facilities of the NASD and the NYSE will be combined into a single subsidiary.140
In Desiderio v. NASD,141 the plaintiff argued that her Fifth and Seventh Amendment
rights were violated by the NASD when she was required to agree to an arbitration provision in
her offer of employment as a securities broker. The court held that the SEC had not compelled
the NASD to require arbitration and that there was no state action. According to the court, the
NASD “is a private corporation that receives no federal or state funding. Its creation was not
mandated by statute, nor does the government appoint its members or serve on any NASD board
or committee. Moreover, the fact that a business entity is subject to ‘extensive and detailed’
state regulation does not convert that organization’s actions into those of the state.”142
A rather different result was obtained in cases involving California Ethics Standards for
Neutral Arbitrators in Contractual Arbitration (“California Standards”), which in certain respects
139

See Marilyn Blumberg Cane & Marc J. Greenspon, Securities Arbitration: Bankrupt,
Bothered & Bewildered, 7 STAN. J. OF LAW. BUS. & FIN. 131 (2002); Jennifer J. Johnson, Wall
Street Meets The Wild West: Bringing Law and Order to Securities Arbitration, 84 N.C.L.REV.
123 (2005); David S. Ruder, Elements of a Fair and Efficient Securities Arbitration System, 40
ARIZ. L. REV. 1101 (1998); Marc I. Steinberg, Securities Arbitration: Better for Investors Than
the Courts?, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1503 (1996).
140

See NASD and NYSE Group Announce Plan to Consolidate Regulation of Securities
Firms, NASD News Release, Nov. 28, 2006, available at
http://www.nasd.com/PressRoom/NewsReleases/2006newsreleases/NASDW_017963.
141

191 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 1999).

142

Id. at 206, citing Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350 (1974).
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were in conflict with NASD and NYSE rules relating to arbitrations. In Mayo v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc.143 a federal district court held that the California Standards were preempted by
both the Exchange Act and the Federal Arbitration Act. The court found conflicts between the
SROs and California Standards with regard to arbitrator disclosures, control of the case by the
SRO Director of Arbitration as opposed to the parties under court supervision, and with respect
to the applicability of the California Standards in SRO dispute resolution cases. Further, the
court found that SROs are an integral part of the federal regulatory scheme administered by the
SEC and that an important function of the SROs was the conduct of arbitrations. If SROs were
forced to comply with the California Standards they would become subject to a patchwork of
state regulation at odds with their national function.
In Jevne v. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County,144 a California appellate court
also held that the California Standards were preempted by the Exchange Act, but on narrower
grounds. The court thought that there was no actual conflict between the arbitrator disclosure
provisions of the California Standards and SRO procedural rules, but that the added disclosure
provisions were nevertheless an obstacle to the SRO procedures because the California standards
would increase the costs and complexity of and inject uncertainty into the arbitration process and
therefore frustrate the Exchange Act’s purpose of protecting investors and the public. In view of
143

Mayo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 258 F. Supp. 2d 1097, amended by 260 F. Supp. 2d
979 (N.D. Cal. 2003); Accord, Wilmot v. McNabb, 269 F. Supp.2d 1203 (N.D. Cal. 2003). But
see Credit Suisse First Boston Corp. v. Grunwald (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2003). The court in Mayo
also held that the California Standards were preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act because
they interfered with the contractual provisions between a broker-dealer and its customer to
arbitrate according to SRO procedural rules.
144

Jevne v. Superior Ct., 111 P.3d 954 (Cal. 2006).
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the SEC’s intense oversight in the area of SRO arbitrations, the court was reluctant to second
guess the federal agency on this matter.

With respect to the procedures for arbitrator

disqualification, the court did find a direct conflict between the California Standards and SRO
procedural rules, and therefore found preemption on this ground as well. In these cases SRO
rules were essentially treated as SEC rules, and the SROs were therefore essentially regarded as
state actors.
The creation of FINRA generated some adverse comments on the combination of NYSE
and NASD arbitration, to the effect that investor rights would be reduced by cutting the number
of available arbitration venues in half.145 The SEC found that the combination of SRO arbitration
facilities was consistent with the Exchange Act and would take advantage of economies of
scale.146 As the SEC noted, the criticisms of compelled arbitration go beyond the issues of
FINRA’s creation. Yet, if FINRA is for some purposes exercising delegated governmental
functions, is this compelled broker-dealer-customer arbitration forum an alternative federal
court? If so, how should it be governed and operated and how should arbitrators be selected?

IV.

DUE PROCESS RIGHTS OF PERSONS SUBJECT TO FINRA
If FINRA were held to be a government entity, persons subject to its regulation would

have a variety of constitutional and statutory rights applicable to those who deal with federal
administrative agencies.

In addition to basic constitutional protections, the Administrative

145

SEC FINRA Approval, supra note 3, at 36.

146

Id. at 77.
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Procedure Act,147 the Freedom of Information Act148 and the Government in the Sunshine
Act149 could become applicable to the deliberations, rule-making procedures and disciplinary
activities of SROs. A wide variety of other statutes and regulations could apply to the funding,
budgeting, contracting activities and other operations of the SROs. The SROs would be turned
into government bureaucracies and would not be able to recruit personnel, pay salaries and
operate in the manner in which they have long conducted themselves. These problems will
become apparent at the PCAOB if that body is declared a government entity. Currently, even
though the PCAOB affords the auditing firms and accountants subject to its jurisdiction certain
rights, it denies that it is subject to the constraints applicable to government agencies.150
At one time, SROs denied their members certain rights commonly viewed as fundamental
in connection with their investigations and disciplinary proceedings. For example, persons under
147

5 U.S.C. § 551 (1994). This statute applies to federal agencies. An “agency is defined as
“each authority of the Government of the United States, whether or not it is within or subject to
review by another agency . . .” Id. at § 551(1). The SEC is covered by this definition.
Commercial Capital Corp. v. SEC, 360 F.2d 856 (7th Cir. 1966).
148

5 U.S.C. § 552 (2002). An “agency” for purposes of the coverage of this statute includes
“any independent regulatory agency.” Id. at § 552(f)(1). In Independent5 Investor Protective
League v. NYSE, 367 F. Supp. 1376 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), the court held that the NYSE was not an
“agency” under the Freedom of Information Act because it was not an authority of the
Government of the United States but rather a not-for-profit corporation of the State of New
York. Since then, there has been litigation as to whether advisory committees or consultants of
federal agencies are subject to this statute. See Washington Legal Foundation v. American Bar
Ass’n Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary, 648 F. Supp. 1353 (D.C.D.C. 1986);
Washington Research Project, Inc. v. Department of Health, Ed. And Welfare, 504 F.2d 238
(D.C. Cir.), cert. den. 421 U.S. 963 (1974).
149

5 U.S.C. § 552b (1995).
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investigation were not entitled to bring counsel to investigative hearings.151 By reason of the
1975 amendments to the Exchange Act, the SEC’s oversight of the NYSE, the NASD and other
SROs was made consistent and assured that all members of SROs would be treated fairly in
connection with investigations and disciplinary proceedings. In addition, since 1975, all SRO
rules were required to be approved by the SEC, and in that process they become subject to the
notice and comment process.
Under the Exchange Act, the rules of an exchange must “assure a fair representation of
its members in the selection of its directors and administration of its affairs.”152 In addition, the
rules of the exchange must “provide for the equitable allocation of reasonable dues, fees and
other charges among its members and issuers and other persons using its facilities.”153 With
respect to discipline, SROs must provide a “fair procedure” which includes bringing specific
charges, notifying a person subject to discipline and giving him an opportunity to defend against
such charges and keeping a record. Further, in order to impose a sanction, there needs to be a
statement setting forth the act or practice in which the member engaged or omitted, the
150

See Comment Letter from Deloitte & Touche, LLP to SEC, File No. PCAOB-2003-07
(Apr. 15, 2004), PCAOB Proposed Rules on Investigations and Adjudications, Apr. 15, 2004, at
53.
151

See Villani v. New York Stock Exch., 348 F. Supp. 1185 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff’d Sloan v.
NYSE, 489 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1973).
152

Exchange Act § 6(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(3) (2000). Before it became an exchange a
similar provision applied to the NASD. Exchange Act § 15A(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(4)
(2000).
153

Exchange Act § 6(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(3) (2000). Before it became an exchange a
similar provision applied to the NASD. Exchange Act § 15A(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(4)
(2000).
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provisions of the regulation(s) violated and the sanction and reason for its imposition.154 A
person who has been sanctioned by an exchange or association has a right to appeal from a
decision by the trier of fact to the SRO board or other committee, which in the case of the NASD
has been the NAC.155 A further appeal to the SEC also is provided.156 In most respects, all of
these due process rights are similar to the rights granted to persons subject to SEC disciplinary
proceedings.157 As pointed out by the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
when the 1975 Act Amendments were drafted, since the SROs “exercise government power . . .
by imposing a disciplinary sanction, broadly defined, on a member or person affiliated with a
member . . . [they] must be required to conform their activities to fundamental standards of due
process.”158

154

15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(7), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(h)(1) (2000).

155

See National Adjudicatory Council, FINRA Regulatory Enforcement (NAC), available at
http://www.finrahttp://www.finra.org/regulatoryenforcement/adjudication/nationaladjudicatoryc
ouncil(nac)/index.html (Aug. 2, 2007).
156

Exchange Act § 19(e)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(e)(2) (2000).

157

See SEC Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. §§ 201-1106. Prior to 1975, these procedural rights
were afforded to persons subject to NASD discipline, but not stock exchange discipline. See THE
REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITIES OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING,
HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, SECURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY, S. Doc. No. 13, at 149 (1st Sess.
1973).
158

S. Comm. On Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, Securities Act Amendments of 1975,
Rep. No. 94-75, at 24-25 (1975). The Committee also noted that SROs can adversely affect the
interests of particular persons by denying membership to an applicant or requiring members to
case doing business in specified ways. Id.
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All SRO new rules and rule changes must be filed with the SEC and approved by the
SEC before they can become effective.159 In addition, the SEC can abrogate, add to or delete
from existing SRO rules.160 In the course of this rule-making approval process, any new SRO
rules or amendments are put out for comment, and the comments are considered by the SEC in
its determination as to whether to approve the SRO’s filing. The Senate Committee Report on
the 1975 Act Amendments to the Exchange Act criticized the fact that SROs did not have to
explain or justify their rule proposals and expressed the view that the SEC should require a
“concise general statement of the basis and purpose” of proposed rule changes in order to hold
SROs “to the same standards of policy justification that the Administrative Procedure Act
imposes on the SEC.”161
While the SROs would deny that they are governmental entities subject to the
Administrative Procedure Act, all of the procedures set forth above essentially guarantee that the
procedures of the Act relating to disciplinary proceedings and rule-making are followed. The
degree of SEC oversight of these processes is extensive, perhaps at times overly rigid and
bureaucratic.

To subject disciplinary proceedings and rule-making to greater scrutiny by

declaring that SROs are subject to the constitutional and administrative law protections
applicable to government agencies would probably ossify the work of the SROs, and would not

159

Exchange Act § 19(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (2000).

160

Exchange Act § 19(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (2000).

161

S. Comm. On Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Rep. No. 94-75, at 29 (1975).
47

All rights reserved by Roberta S. Karmel-- DRAFT-- Do not quote without permission
necessarily be useful.162 At the same time, to the extent that SROs do not afford persons subject
to their discipline ample due process protections in their disciplinary and rule-making processes,
the legitimacy of SRO action is undermined and an SRO could be subject to adverse court
review.163

V.

SRO RULE-MAKING TO DISPLACE ANTI-TRUST REGULATION AND STATE
LAWS
A.

GENERAL

One of the interesting aspects of SRO rule-making is that an NASD or NYSE rule can
create a conflict with state laws or federal anti-trust laws. If the SRO rule is then viewed as
federal securities regulation, it can displace state law or anti-trust law. There have been only a
few cases where preemption of state law has occurred because of an SRO rule, but FINRA rulemaking could create more such conflicts in the future. Although there have been more cases of
conflict between SRO rules and the anti-trust laws, a recent Supreme Court case164 giving the
SEC considerable leeway in displacing the anti-trust laws will probably lead to fewer such cases
in the future.

162

Cf. Metzger, note 22, supra at 1408-09, 1456.

163

See Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963); Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905
F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
164

Credit Suisse Secs. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 127 S. Ct. 2383 (2007).
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Of particular importance with regard both to state law and anti-trust law conflicts with
SRO rules is the NASD Corporate Financing Rule.165 Like all NASD rules, this rule applies to
NASD members but affects the structure of initial public offerings (“IPOs”) because it regulates
underwriters’ compensation. This is a merit regulation

analogous to state blue sky merit

regulation which enabled state commissioners to determine whether underwritings were “fair,
just and equitable.”166 Administration of such statutes included a review of a corporation’s
capitalization and the sale of cheap stock to underwriters and insiders. Similarly, a wide variety
of arrangements between underwriters and issuers are included in the analysis of underwriters
compensation, and the NASD has the power to disapprove of “unfair” compensation.
B.

SRO PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW167

Federal preemption of state law may occur under the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution and Congress has frequently preempted state law in the area of financial regulation.
Preemption may be express or implied. Preemption is express when there is an explicit statutory
command that state law be displaced.168
165

Preemption is implied and state law is therefore

NASD Rule 2710.

166

See generally Mark A. Sargent, Reporter, Report on State Merit Regulation of Securities
Offerings, 41 BUS. LAW. 785 (1986).

167

A more comprehensive treatment of this topic by the author is contained in Roberta S.
Karmel, Reconciling Federal and State Interests in Securities Regulation in the United States
and Europe, 28 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 495, 497-524 (2003).
168

See Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 504 U.S. 374, 382 (1992). A clear example of
express preemption in financial regulation is in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (“ERISA”) which states that the provisions of that act “shall supersede any and all state
laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan.” 29 U.S.C. §
1144(a).
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displaced “if federal law so thoroughly occupies a legislative field as to make reasonable the
inference that Congress left no room for the states to supplement it.”169 This type of implied
preemption is often referred to as field preemption. State law may be displaced under an implied
conflict analysis if either it is impossible to comply with both a state and a federal law, or if the
state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress.”170 An example of conflict preemption in securities law is Edgar v. Mite
Corp., where an Illinois takeover statute was found to conflict with the Exchange Act.171 In all
cases involving preemption, the courts look to the intent of Congress.172
When the federal securities laws were initially passed, Congress did not explicitly
preempt state law. To the contrary, Congress inserted “savings clauses” in both the Securities
Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”)173 and the Exchange Act.174 In view of these savings clauses, the

169

Cipollone v. Ligget Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992). See also Shaw v. Delta Air
Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 96-99 (1983) (finding that state laws having a connection with or reference
to employee benefit plans are preempted by ERISA, with which Congress intended to preempt
an entire field); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator, 331 U.S. 218 (1947); Patenaude v. Equitable Life Ins.,
290 F.3d 1020, 1024 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[A] statute may so completely preempt state law that it
occupies the entire field, barring assertion of any state law claims and permitting removal to
federal court.”).

170

Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).

171

457 U.S. 624 (1982).

172

Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Management Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 96 (1992).

173

Former Section 18 of the Securities Act provided: “Nothing in this Subchapter shall
affect the jurisdiction of the securities commission (or any agency or office performing like
functions) of any State or Territory of the United States, or the District of Columbia, over any
security or any person.” Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 18, 48 Stat. 74, 85 (current version at
15 U.S.C. § 77r).
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Supreme Court found that state blue sky laws regulating the substantive merits of securities
offerings remained valid after the Securities Act and the Exchange Act were passed,175 but the
securities industry chafed at having to comply with federal and state regulation, and advocated
preemption of state blue sky laws concerning offerings and the regulation of brokers and dealers.
Initially, complaints concerning duplication and inconsistency of unnecessary regulatory burdens
were answered by a 1980 statute176 adding (former) Section 19(c)(1) to the Securities Act
authorizing the SEC to cooperate with state government representatives in securities matters to
achieve effective, uniform securities regulations with a minimum interference with the business
of capital formation.177 Although the SEC then worked with the North American Securities
Administrators Association (“NASAA”) and the NASD to develop a state law uniform limited
offering exemption and a uniform system of registration for securities salesmen,178 there was
174

Former Section 28(a) of the Exchange Act was similar to former Section 18 of the
Securities Act. It provided: “Nothing in this chapter shall affect the jurisdiction of the securities
commission (or any agency or officer performing like functions) of any State over any security
or any person insofar as it does not conflict with the provisions of this chapter or the rules and
regulations thereunder.”15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1982).
175

See Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917); Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock Yards
Co., 242 U.S. 559 (1917); Merrick v. N.W. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568 (1917).
176

Omnibus Small Business Capital Formation Act of 1980, § 505, Pub. L. No. 96-477, 94
Stat. 2275, 2292-93 (adding Section 19(c) of the Securities Act).
177

15 U.S.C. § 77s(c)(1), (2) (now 77s(d) (2002). The statute mandated an annual
conference of SEC and state regulators for the purpose of developing uniform securities forms
and procedures and a small issues exemption from registration. Further, the act provided that
“[n]othing in this Act shall be construed as authorizing preemption of State law.” Id. at §§ 77s(d)
(3),(4).
178

See Securities Uniformity: Annual Conference on Uniformity of Securities Law,
Securities Act Release No. 33-7050, 56 SEC Docket 764 (1994), available at 1994 WL 95225.
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considerable securities industry dissatisfaction with the slow and essentially voluntary progress
of the SEC and NASAA in achieving uniform regulations pursuant to Section 19(c).179
Much more sweeping deregulation of the state blue sky laws through preemption was
accomplished in the late 1990s, first by the National Securities Markets Improvements Act of
1996 (“NSMIA”)180 and then by the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998
(“SLUSA”).181 NSMIA preempted state securities law in three areas. First, it preempted blue
sky securities registration, merit review and prospectus disclosure requirements for SEC
registered investment companies and stock exchange and Nasdaq listed securities.

It also

preempted blue sky law in most private placements.182 Prior to NSMIA blue sky laws all
contained a requirement for registration of securities, but most state laws had an exemption from
their registration requirements for issuers listed on a national securities exchange.183 The NASD
had lobbied for Nasdaq listed securities to be similarly exempt, but NASAA wished greater
179

State Regulators Adopt Model Commodity Code, 17 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 15,
at 622 (April 12, 1985); 12 JOSEPH C. LONG, BLUE SKY LAW § 7:32, at 7-71 to 73 (2002); Hugh
H. Makens et al., Blue Sky Practice Part I: Doing it Right: Avoiding Liability Arising from State
Private Offerings under ULOE and Limited Offering Exemptions, in AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTEAMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REGULATION D OFFERINGS AND PRIVATE PLACEMENTS 271, 280
(2001); David F.E. Banks, Hawaii Response to Regulation D, 23 HAWAII B. J. 1, 3 (1991)); Mark
A. Sargent & Hugh H. Makens, ULOE: New Hope, New Challenge, 45 BUS. LAW. 1319, 131920 (1990).
180

Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.)

181

Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.105-353, 112, Stat.
3227 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
182

15 U.S.C. §77r (1996). See, e.g., Pinnacle Commc’ns Int’l Inc. v. Am. Family Mortgage
Corp., 417 F. Supp. 2d 1073 (Minn. 2006).
183

See Mark A. Sargent, State Disclosure Regulation and the Allocation of Regulatory
Responsibilities, 46 MD. L. REV.1027, 1032 (1987).
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control over the criteria for a blue chip exemption.184 NSMIA essentially mandated a blue chip
exemption for all nationally traded securities. This preemption did not completely eliminate
merit standards because of the NASD regulation of underwriting terms and conditions with
respect to offerings underwritten by broker-dealers.185

This SRO regulation is a uniform

national standard, whereas state blue sky regulations were quite varied.
Second, NSMIA preempted state regulation of broker-dealers with respect to capital,
custody, margin, financial responsibility, records, bonding and reporting requirements to the
extent inconsistent with federal law.186 Third, the SEC was given exclusive regulatory authority
over investment advisers to SEC registered investment companies and advisers with $25 million
or more in assets under management.187 With respect to broker-dealers, NSMIA provided that
“[n]o law, rule, regulation, or order, or other administrative action of any State or political
subdivision thereof shall establish capital, custody, margin, financial responsibility, making and
keeping records, bonding, or financial or operational reporting requirements for brokers, dealers,
municipal securities dealers, government securities brokers, or government securities dealers that
differ from, or are in addition to, the requirements in those areas established under this

184

See NASAA Agrees to Propose Amendments to ’56 Uniform Acts at Spring Meeting, 18
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA), Mar. 21, 1986, at 399.
185

NASD Rule 2710.

186

National Securities Markets Improvements Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, § 103(a),
110 Stat. 3420 (1996) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §78o(h)(1) (2006)). Although the SEC
regulates all of these areas, further regulation is imposed and enforced by SROs.
187

15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 et seq (1940).
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chapter.”188 The preemption of state regulation of SEC regulated broker-dealers and investment
advisers and their associated persons was not complete.

The States retained authority to

investigate and bring enforcement actions for fraud or deceit or other unlawful conduct by a
broker-dealer or investment adviser or their associated persons.
The congressional justification for the preemption provisions of NSMIA was that the
system of dual federal and state securities regulation had resulted in duplicative and unnecessary
regulation.

Further, this dual system was redundant, costly and ineffective.189

Therefore

regulatory responsibility was allocated based on the nature of the securities offering.190
Inherently national offerings were made subject only to federal regulation, and the regulation of
broker-dealer members of the NASD and NYSE was also preempted.191
SLUSA was even more deregulatory and its way of effecting preemption was more
radical. SLUSA provides that no class action based on state law alleging fraud in connection
with the purchase or sale of a “covered security” (essentially an exchange listed security) may be
maintained in state or federal court and any such action shall be removable to a federal district
court and dismissed.192 Although the Congress that passed SLUSA was generally committed to
188

National Securities Markets Improvements Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, § 103(a),
110 Stat. 3420 (1996) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §78o(h)(1) (2006)).
189

H.R. Conf. Rep. 104-864, at 39 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3920.

190

Id. at 40.

191

Id. at 39. See Manning Gilbert Warren III, Federalism and Investor Protection:
Constitutional Restraints on Preemption of State Remedies for Securities Fraud, 60 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 169, 170 (1997).
192

Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, §101, 112
Stat. 3227 (1998) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p(b)-(c) (2000)).
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federalism, it found that promoting efficient national securities markets was more convincing
and compelling than reinforcing state rights.193 State securities fraud cases not instituted as class
actions were not preempted.194
Until the preemption of state blue sky law by NSMIA and SLUSA, it was generally
accepted that there was neither field nor conflict preemption of state securities anti-fraud laws
because SEC disclosure laws and regulations and state disclosure or fiduciary laws
complimented one another. Where a state court action is instituted as a broad statutory or
common law antifraud claim, it is difficult to find preemption unless the SEC has acted by
adopting detailed regulations. In Zuri-Invest AG v. NatWest Finance, Inc., a federal district court
held that a state fraud action was not preempted by the federal securities laws, including
NSMIA.195 Rather, the primary purpose of NSMIA was to preempt state blue sky laws
regulating the registration and underwriting of securities.

It did not preclude states from

regulating fraudulent conduct or extinguish state claims based on fraud.196 Similar issues have

193

See S. REP. NO. 105-182, at 4 (1998).

194

See Michael A. Perino, Fraud and Federalism: Preempting Private State Securities
Fraud Causes of Action, 50 STAN. L. REV. 273, 287 (1998).
195

177 F. Supp. 2d 189 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); accord, IDS Bond Fund, Inc. v. Gleacher NatWest
Corp., 2002 WL 373455 (D. Minn. March 6, 2002); Gabriel Capital, L.P. v. NatWest Finance,
Inc., 122 F. Supp. 2d 407 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Gabriel Capital, L.P. v. NatWest Finance, Inc., 94 F.
Supp. 2d 491 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). But see Myers v. Merrill Lynch, 1999 WL 696082, at *8-10
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 1999), aff’d 249 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2001).
196

See also H.R. 104-622, as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3877, 3899 (“Committee’s
intention not to alter …. State statutory or common law with respect to fraud or deceit”).
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arisen under SLUSA.197

On the other hand, if the SEC reviews a practice that could be

construed as fraudulent, but determines either it should be permitted to continue or it should
merely be disclosed to investors, can state law which would outlaw such a practice, or impose
liability for its continuation, be allowed to coexist with federal law? This issue was raised in
state law cases challenging payment for order flow and most of the courts which addressed the
issue found implied or field preemption.
Payment for order flow is the remuneration in the form of monetary or other benefits
given to retail securities broker-dealers for routing customers’ orders for execution to particular
wholesale dealers, market makers or exchanges.198 The growth and pervasiveness of payment for
order flow practices in the 1980s and 1990s aroused extensive debate over its merits and harms.
In response, the SEC conducted a comprehensive study of order flow payments. The SEC
concluded that the practice produces the following economic benefits to customers: lower unit
costs; increased retail brokerage firm revenues; lowered commissions; more expeditious
executions; enhanced customer services; increased competition from automated execution
systems and related practices; increased competition between wholesale dealers and exchanges
and vertically integrated firms; and reduced execution costs in all markets, including the

197

See Green v. Ameritrade, Inc., 279 F.3d 590 (8th Cir. 2002) (state contract claim not
preempted by SLUSA).
198

Exchange Act Release No. 34-34902, 59 Fed. Reg. 55006, 55008 (Nov. 2, 1999).
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exchanges.199 The SEC also recognized opposing concerns as to the possible conflict of interest
and breach of duty of best order execution.200
In an attempt to address the issue with particularity, the SEC amended Rule 10b-10,
which governs confirmation disclosure to broker-dealer customers, in 1994.201 Amended Rule
10b-10 requires a broker-dealer to disclose in each transaction confirmation slip whether
payment for order flow was received, and that the source and nature of the payment would be
available at the customer’s request.202 In addition, the SEC adopted a new rule, 11Ac1-3, which
requires annual disclosure to customers of a broker’s or dealer’s policies regarding receipt of
payments for order flow, the market makers to which customer orders are routed, and the
aggregate amount of payments received for order flow in the previous year.203
Subsequently, payment for order flow was tested in a number of state courts in cases
claiming breach of fiduciary duty. The highest courts of New York,204 Minnesota,205 Illinois,206
199

Payment for Order Flow, Exchange Act Release No. 34-33026, at 24-26, 58 Fed. Reg.
52934, 52939-40 (Oct. 13, 1993).
200

Id. at 55008.

201

See Payment for Order Flow, Exchange Act Release No. 34902, 59 Fed. Reg. 55006,
(Nov. 2, 1994). The amended Rule 10b-10, which became effective in October 1995, defined
order flow payment “as any form or arrangement compensating brokers or dealers in return for
the routing of orders.” Id. at 55008.
202

Id. at 55010. The SEC rejected as too burdensome and unworkable proposals that order
flow payments be passed through to the customers, id. at 55010-11, n.42, as well as its own
initial proposal that brokers disclose the amount of payments for order flow. Id. at 55010, n.39.

203

17 C.F.R. § 240.11Ac1-3 (1995).

204

Guice v. Charles Schwab & Co., 674 N.E. 2d 282 (N.Y. 1996).

205

Dahl v. Charles Schwab & Co., 545 N.W. 2d 918 (Minn. 1996).
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and Pennsylvania,207 as well as two other states’ intermediate appellate courts,208 found that the
1975 amendments to the Exchange Act and SEC disclosure regulations impliedly preempted
state common law regarding any breach of fiduciary duty involved in payment for order flow
practices. The prevailing view of the state courts that considered cases alleging that payment for
order flow was a breach of fiduciary duty was that federal law and regulations impliedly
preempted state law.

Except for the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which found field

preemption, all other courts found implicit conflict preemption, in that permitting state common
law cases to go forward would be an obstacle to the national market system provisions of the
Exchange Act. The interesting question for this article is what if Rules 10b-10 and 11Ac1-3 had
been NASD, rather than SEC rules? Now that FINRA has a single rule book applicable to all
SEC registered broker-dealers, delegation by the SEC to FINRA to establish this type of
controversial, complicated rule-making, where broad industry input is important for future
compliance, seems likely. Would courts similarly find implied conflict preemption by reason of
an SRO rule?
A few cases involving the California Standards relating to arbitrator qualifications would
suggest an affirmative answer to this question. Because these standards went beyond the

206

Orman v. Charles Schwab & Co., 688 N.E. 2d 620 (Ill. 1997).

207

Shulick v. PaineWebber & Co., 722 A.2d 148 (Pa. 1998).

208

Eirman v. Olde Disc. Corp., 697 So.2d 865 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Mickey v. Charles
Schwab, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 213 (Ca. App. 1998). But in Thomas v. Charles Schwab, 1995 WL
626522 (W.D. La. 1995), the Tenth Judicial District Court for the Parish of Nachitoches,
Louisana, found no express preemption nor inferred congressional preemptive intent.
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NASD’s arbitrator qualification standards, the NASD adopted a rule requiring parties to an
arbitration to waive the California Standards. In a series of cases, the California Superior
Court209 and the Ninth Circuit210 held that the NASD Rules regarding arbitrator qualifications
pre-empted the California Standards, which had been promulgated by the California Judicial
Council. The reason for such preemption was that the NASD and NYSE had “operated their
own securities arbitration services for decades under federal auspices” and their standards and
procedures were “not entirely consistent with the California standards.”211 Since the SEC had
approved these SRO standards, preemption had occurred by delegated authority.212
C.

CONFLICT WITH ANTITRUST LAWS

Where regulatory statutes are silent with regard to antitrust, courts are required to
determine whether, and in what respects there has been an implicit repeal of the antitrust laws.213
Implied repealers of the antitrust laws “are strongly disfavored, and have only been found in
cases of plain repugnancy between the antitrust and regulatory provisions.”214 Conflicts between

209

See Jevne v. Superior Court, 111 P.3d 954 (Cal. 2005).

210

Credit Suisse First Boston Corp. v. Grunwald, 400 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2005); NASD
Dispute Resolution, Inc. v. Judicial Council, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 12433 (9th Cir. 2007).
211

Id. at *4.

212

Credit Suisse First Boston Corp. v. Grunwald, 400 F.3d 1119, 1128 (9th Cir. 2005). In
another case, involving compulsory NYSE arbitration between a registered representative and a
member firms and associated persons, the Second Circuit held that such compulsory arbitration
was within the purposes of the Exchange Act, as amended in 1975. Drayer v. Krasner, 572 F.2d
348 (2d Cir. 1978).
213

Credit Suisse Secs. (USA), LLC v. Billing, 127 S. Ct. 2383 (2007).

214

United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 351 (1963).
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the antitrust laws and the securities laws involving SRO regulation have been common, because
the initial foundation for SRO regulation was fixed minimum commissions for NYSE members
and preferential price dealing for NASD members. In Silver v. New York Stock Exchange,215 a
nonmember broker sued the NYSE under the Sherman Act after the NYSE ordered the
discontinuance of his wire connections with the offices of NYSE members without notice,
explanation or a hearing. In this case, a test for reconciling antitrust laws with securities
regulation was set forth as follows: “Repeal [of the antitrust laws] is to be regarded as implied
only if necessary to make the Securities Exchange Act work, and even then only to the minimum
extent necessary.”216 The Court held that no policy of the Exchange Act was served by this
conduct and therefore the NYSE had acted in violation of the Sherman Act.
In the context of the unfixing of commission rates and a restructuring of the securities
industry, over a decade later the Supreme Court broadened the area in which the antitrust laws
may be impliedly repealed by the securities laws. In Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange,
Inc.,217 the Court held that the antitrust laws did not apply to the system of fixed commission
rates then utilized by the stock exchanges because the SEC had the authority to do away with
fixed commissions if it found them inconsistent with the regulatory structure. Direct and active
supervision by the SEC over rate-fixing by securities exchanges negated the possibility of
antitrust liability for fixed commissions. In a second case of the same year, the Court found that

215

373 U.S. 341 (1963).

216

Id. at 357.

217

422 U.S. 659 (1975).
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the SEC had not exercised the same degree of supervision with regard to the secondary trading
of mutual funds, but read the applicable legislative history as granting the SEC the informed
administrative judgement to do so.218
The 1975 amendments to the Exchange Act, passed in the same year as these cases, made
clear that the SEC’s role in passing on exchange or other SRO rules must include an evaluation
of the anti-competitive aspect of such rules. Within one year after the effective date of the
statute, the SEC was required to determine whether the rules of any national securities exchange
or registered securities association complied with the Exchange Act. Thereafter, proposed rule
changes of exchanges and associations were subjected to prior rule-making procedures by the
SEC and could not take effect without an SEC finding that such rule was consistent with the
Exchange Act. These provisions required the SEC to take competition into consideration in
reviewing all existing and any new exchange or association rules.219
A more recent anti-trust case addressed questionable joint action by underwriters. Credit
Suisse Securities (USA) v. Billing220 was a class action against a number of investment banks,
acting as underwriters, alleging various illegal practices: (1) laddering, or buying shares of an
IPO at escalating prices; (2) paying unusually high commissions on other securities; and (3)
tying or purchasing less desirable securities. The Second Circuit essentially held that since these
practices were alleged to be illegal under both the securities laws and the antitrust laws, the
218

United States v. Nat’l Ass’n of Secs. Dealers, Inc. 422 U.S. 694 (1975).

219

See Exchange Act § 6(b)(8), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(8); Exchange Act § 11A(1)(C)(ii), 15
U.S.C. 78k-1(a)(C)(ii); Exchange Act § 15A(b)(9), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(9).
220

127 S. Ct. 2383 (2007).
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antitrust case could proceed.221 The Supreme Court framed the issue differently as whether there
was a plain repugnancy between the antitrust claims and the federal securities laws, and
concluded that there was. Referring to Gordon and NASD, Court set forth a number of factors
showing sufficient incompatibility to warrant an implication of antitrust repeal: (1) regulatory
authority under the securities laws to supervise the activities in question; (2) evidence that the
SEC has exercised such authority; and (3) a risk of conflicting guidance under both the antitrust
and securities laws.222 In the Court’s view since the activities under attack were in an area
important to the functioning of the capital markets, only an expert body like the SEC could
properly determine whether the activities were legal or illegal, since all underwriting syndicates
involve joint action, and therefore the courts should be precluded from judging these activities
under the antitrust laws.
In the antitrust cases discussed above, the rules which permitted the conduct under attack
were all SRO, not SEC, rules, although the SEC had authority to approve, disapprove or amend
these rules. It was therefore SROs, not the SEC, which was making the determination in the first
instance to condone conduct that could be a violation of the antitrust laws. Yet, none of the
cases focused on the fact that an SRO rule was displacing the antitrust laws. Rather, the focus
was on the SEC’s authority and the SEC’s oversight of the conduct in question.

VI.

CONCLUSION

221

426 F.3d 130 (2005).

222

127 S. Ct. 2392.
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Although FINRA may not be a government entity, in all or virtually all of its activities, it
can be viewed as exercising powers delegated to it by the SEC. This is a delegation from an
agency which itself is exercising delegated powers, and therefore is not directly accountable to
the public. Accountability to its members has been undermined by the governance reforms
imposed by the SEC. In the final analysis, FINRA is accountable only the SEC. Yet, initially the
regulatory powers of the NYSE were not governmental but a matter of private contract between
the NYSE and its members. Similarly, the origins of the NASD were in a trade association. At
what point did these powers become transmogrified into governmental powers? This was a
gradual development, probably fixed without much consideration by the 1975 Act Amendments
to the Exchange Act.
Although FINRA undoubtedly will deny that it is an agency subject to the Constitutional
and legislative constraints applicable to the SEC, in many areas it will nevertheless “voluntarily”
adopt equivalent procedures. Two important questions are raised by this construct: First, should
further compliance be compelled; and second, what is the real difference between FINRA and a
government agency? One difference is its corporate governance. Another difference is its
funding. But as the SEC exercises ever increasing oversight of FINRA are these differences
sufficient to keep FINRA a private sector body?
As organizations, SROs have several advantages over government agencies. They can be
more flexible in their hiring, pay higher salaries and develop cadres of experts as their
employees. They are financed by assessments on the securities industry, rather than out of
general tax revenues. They are not bound by the many accountability mechanisms imposed upon
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government organizations, which may make these organizations operate in a more open and
democratic fashion, but also can turn them into slow moving bureaucracies. Because SROs
involve the securities industry in their decision making, they are able to fashion regulations
which often are more realistic than government regulations, and effect voluntary compliance
with these regulations. Yet, the very freedom of action that SROs have may sometimes give
them the ability to ignore the Constitutional rights of persons subject to their rule-making or
disciplinary actions. When SROs are exercising governmental powers, they should be subject to
Constitutional constraints in their dealings with securities industry personnel and the public.
They should similarly be bound by the fundamental due process protections of the
Administrative Procedure Act and similar statutes.
Nevertheless, to subject SROs to all of the constraints to which the SEC is subject with
regard to their operations would reduce their utility in the scheme of securities regulation. If
FINRA is going to be regulated like the SEC, it may as well become part of the SEC. If the SEC
becomes too controlling of FINRA’s governance and operations, FINRA will no longer be an
SRO. While, criticism of SROs as being insufficiently responsive to the public interest has been
leveled over the years by Congress, there is a danger that FINRA will be insufficiently
responsive to the needs and concerns of the securities industry, and will become merely an arm
of the SEC. Should this occur, the duplicative nature of SEC and SRO regulation of brokerdealers will make such regulation inefficient and ineffective. FINRA should be given the
opportunity to operate as an independent, non-political expert body engaged in the regulation of
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broker-dealers, without undue interference from the SEC or Congress, but it will have to prove
that it can be sensitive and responsive to the public interest.
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